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Normalizing Novelty:
Regulating Biotechnological Risk
at the U.S. EPA*
Les Levidow & Susan Carr**
Introduction: Disputed Novelty
Biotechnology provokes wide-ranging debate about social, political
and environmental risks. For genetically-modified organisms (GMOs),
often these risks have been attributed to the novelty of genetic
modification (GM) techniques, their commercial products and the
consequent means to industrialize agriculture. In such ways, GMOs
have been stigmatized as abnormal. They are portrayed as violating
natural processes - or else as benignly simulating Nature - amid
contending visions of the social order. 1
Since the 1980s GMOs have been promoted as "environmentally-
friendly products." 2 According to proponents, such products offer a
natural extension of traditional breeding, precise genetic changes, and
remedies for the problems caused by intensive agriculture. The
biotechnology industry has adopted the language of environmental
sustainability; for example, "in-built genetic information" helps GM
crops to protect themselves from pests and disease, thus reducing
dependence upon agrochemicals. 3
* This essay arises mainly from two studies funded by Britain's Economic and
Social Research Council: Regulating the Risks of Biotechnology (1989-91) and
From Precautionary to Risk-Based Regulation: the Case of GMO Releases (1995-
96). Follow-up research was done during a Europe-based study, Safety Regulation of
Transgenic Crops: Completing the Internal Market? funded by the European
Commission, DG XII/E5, Ethical, Legal and Socio-Economic Aspects, Biotechnology
horizontal pro ramme (1997-99. We thank the ten interviewees quoted here,
including severa at the EPA. For editorial suggestions, we thank Jane Rissler, Helge
Torgerson, Roger Wrubel and anonymous referees of this journal.
** Dr. Carr received her Ph.D. from the Open University where she is a Senior
Systems Lecturer. E-mail: S. Carr@open.ac.uk.
Dr. Levidow received his Ph.D. from the Open University where he is a Research
Fellow at the Centre for Technology Strategy. E-mail: L.Levidow@open.ac.uk.
1 See Les Levidow, Simulating Mother Nature, Industrializing Agriculture, in
Future Natural: Nature, Science, Culture 55 (G. Robertson et al., eds., 1996).
2 See Les Levidow & Joyce Tait, The Greening of Biotechnology: GMOs as
Environment-Friendly Products 18(5) Sci. & Pub. Po. 271 (1991).
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According to critics, however, GMOs will aggravate the hazards of
intensive agriculture, e.g., by extending dependence upon agrochemical
or single-gene solutions, by accelerating resistance to pests, and by
imposing new hazards. From the critics' standpoint, the basic problem
is intensive monoculture, which generates the need for chemical or
genetic fixes: "Biotechnology offers an apparent respite for monoculture
by lowering the pesticide input, offering an acceptable environmental
cost, for a while, if they are lucky," according to a U.S. campaigner. 4
As GMOs carry the stigma of abnormality, risk regulation has the
implicit task of symbolically normalizing them. 5 In the U.S.,
disputed accounts of novelty have been central to regulating GMOs.
U.S. regulatory debate revolves around the following questions: What
genetic combinations should be classified as novel? What novel effects
warrant regulatory controls and further research? If an effect is already
acceptable for conventional agricultural products, then why shouldn't it
be acceptable for GM products too?
This essay analyses how the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulates GMOs. As is suggested here, the EPA devised
scientific criteria for genetic novelty which indicates "risk" - really
meaning greater uncertainty about risk. In approving products, the EPA
evaluates their potential effects, relative to a baseline influenced by
public debate. By selectively normalizing biotechnological novelty, the
regulatory procedure sets standards for a future environment. Those
dynamics are illuminated by two analytical perspectives - national
regulatory styles and symbolic language in regulatory debates. 6
3 See John Magretta, Growth Through Global Sustainability: An Interview with
Monsantos CEO, Robert Shapiro, Harv. Bus. Rev. Jan-Feb 1997 at 79; Monsanto
Company, Report on Sustainable Development (1997).
4 Interview with representative from the Union of Concerned Scientists (Oct. 24,
1995).
5 See Les Levidow, Biotechnology Regulation as Symbolic Normalization, 6(3)
Tech. Anal. & Strat. Mgmnt. 273 (1994).
6 For a comparison to European approaches see Les Levidow, Regulating Bt
Maize in the USA and Europe: A Scientific-Cultural Comparison, 41 Environment
10 (1999); see also Les Levidow & Susan Carr eds., Precautionary Regulation: GM
Crops in the European Union, 3(3) J. Risk Res. (forthcoming 2000).
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U.S. Regulatory Culture
Theories of "national regulatory style" have been developed to
investigate the sources of legitimacy for policy. Analytical questions
include the following: How are the policy process and public debate
managed? What channels are available for various constituencies to
influence or challenge regulatory policies? How is scientific expertise
constituted and portrayed to legitimize regulatory policy?
In each national style, a different image of science dominates the
process of legitimation and social authority. U.S. regulation presents a
formalistic rule-bound image. By contrast, for example, regulators in
the U.K. regard such a formal scientific method as mere "competence";
their true expertise entails an informal negotiation which builds trust
with those being regulated.7
U.S. risk regulation has been theorized as "adversarial". Regulators
are expected to devise detailed rules, to justify them in clear scientific
terms, and to enforce compliance. 8 The scientific basis of risk
assessment readily comes under challenge from outsiders, such as
industrialists or environmentalists. External challenges are facilitated by
the U.S.'s constitutional separation of powers - especially since the
1970s, when Congress established stronger regulatory mandates.
In general agencies publish proposals for new rules and product
approvals in the Federal Register. That affords a means for soliciting
comments, to which agencies usually must reply. Historically, that
procedure expressed a distrust of regulators, who can gain trust only by
being held publicly accountable for every detail of their policy.9
In regulating hazardous chemicals and drafting new rules, the EPA
had long disputes over the scientific basis for policy. To justify treating
a substance as carcinogenic, it had to extrapolate from animal studies to
humans, and/or extrapolate from documented high-dose harm to
hypothetical low-dose harm. Those predictive uncertainties remained
inherently untestable and thus more vulnerable to challenge. 10
7 See Tim O'Riordan & Brian Wynne, Regulating Environmental Risks: A
Comparative Perspective, in Insuring and Managing Hazardous Risks: From Seveso
to Bhopal and Beyond 389 (P.R. Kleindorfer & H.C. Kunreuther eds., 1987).
8 Id. at 398.
9 See David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great
Britain and the United States (1986).
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Eventually the EPA devised a "science policy" - i.e., specific
criteria for the scientific evidence which would warrant imposing or
deferring regulatory controls. Yet, its rules were criticized for
representing political judgements as science. In response, it developed
"peer review" procedures involving independent scientists, e.g., through
its advisory committee. The EPA, thus, sought authority for decisions
as outcomes of a fair consensual procedure, rather than as truth-claims
about predicted harm. However, the committee procedure itself was
adversarial, and conflicting constructions of science were pitted against
each other. 11 In U.S. regulatory culture, political divergences are often
expressed as disputes about the acceptability of evidence, or a proxy for
the acceptability of risk or of a technological choice. 12
In the case of agricultural GMOs, both the R&D and the risk
debate originated in the U.S., where the issues went beyond biophysical
risk. Early regulatory measures intensified disputes among experts, each
framing the risk issues according to their own scientific discipline; in
general, molecular biologists emphasized the familiarity of GMOs,
while ecologists emphasized their novelty and unpredictability. 1 3
Moreover, the controversy became a social assessment of a new
technology, involving diverse actors beyond the official experts. 14
As Sheila Jasanoff argues, U.S. biotechnology regulation was
structured to minimize opportunities for public influence. Risk-based
rhetoric was deployed to keep GMO regulation within existing
statutory-bureaucratic frameworks. As intended, the absence of new
legislation foreclosed new opportunities for judicial review and sharply
restricted the dissenting public's least constraining avenue of success.
Relative to the broad public debate, decision making was narrowed to
questions of physical risk and safety; new rules focused upon
10 See Sheila Jasanoff, Science, Politics and the Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA,
7 Osiris 2nd 195 (1992).
11 See Jasanoff, supra note 10; Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers
as Policymakers (1990).
12 See Sheila Jasanoff, Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society, in Acceptable
Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management 29 (D. Mayo & R. Hollander,
eds., 1991).
13 See Sheldon Krimsky, Biotechnics and Society- The Rise of Industrial Genetics
(1991).
14 See Camille Limoges et al., Controversies Over Risks in Biotechnology (1973-
89): A Framework of Analysis, in Managing Environmental Risks 155 (1990).
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identifiable product characteristics. As all sides accepted that U.S.
regulation must be "based on science," scientific disputes thus become a
surrogate for unstated ethical or economic conflicts. 15
In the wider public debate about biotechnology, such conflicts have
arisen from contending visions of future farming. GMOs are promoted
as a naturally-based means to exercise a benign control over nature,
towards more efficient agricultural methods. Such claims provoke
arguments about whether biotechnology is Uun/natural," as well as
whether "genetic power" is a friend or foe. This symbolic language
expresses secular techno-myths, which serve as a proxy for risk concerns.
Krinsky and Wrubel argue that such language will subside as the risks
issues are managed by safety regulation. 16
However, U.S. regulators rarely required applicants to supply new
ecological information for safety claims. The U.S. government operated
a minimalist, cost-effective approach requiring a burden of proof that
regulation is warranted. 17 Consequently, the U.S. procedures had a
weak basis for clarifying the risk issues.
For risk regulation, this essay asks the following questions: How are
some GMOs defined as novel? At the commercial stage, how are they
ultimately treated as normal or abnormal? How are the risk-assessment
criteria influenced by pressure groups, and by accounts of sustainable
agriculture? How does symbolic language wane and/or arise in
regulatory arguments?
Framing "Product-Based" Regulation
Regulatory issues were initially framed by the "process versus
product" debate. In general, environmentalist critics argued that all
GMOs should be regulated via new legislation because they result from
genetic modification. Biotechnology proponents argued that GMOs
15 See Sheila Jasanoff, Product, Process, or Programme: Three Cultures and the
Regulation of Biotechnology, in Resistance to New Technology (Martin Bauer ed.,
1995). Her later analysis emphasized how such disputes were avoided: 'U.S.
regulatory practices fostered the impression that the safety of GM crops could reliably
be determined case by case, by technical experts, on the basis of science untainted by
social or political considerations.' See Sheila Jasanoff, Between Risk and Precaution:
Reassessing the Future of GM Crops 3(3) J. Risk. Res. (forthcoming 2000).
16 See e.g., Sheldon Krimsky & Roger Wrubel, Agricultural Biotechnology and the
Environment: Science, Policy and Social Issues (1996).
17 Id. at 251.
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should be regulated only on the basis of specific product characteristics.
Rather than enact new GMO legislation, the U.S. devised "product-
based regulation." In 1986 the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) issued a Coordinated Framework. It set guidelines for
classifying GMOs according to their product categories, for assigning
each category to the relevant federal agency, and for adopting
consistent scientific criteria among the agencies.
Under the Coordinated Framework, GMOs would be regulated (if
at all) like their unmodified counterparts, under existing product
legislation. U.S. agencies could not impose "additional" regulatory
oversight, e.g., by requesting extra data, unless warranted by novel
product characteristics. Agencies were offered only two criteria for such
novelty: "pathogenic" characteristics and "intergeneric organisms." 18
Soon the Department of Agriculture (USDA) cited the OSTP
"pathogenic" criterion to regulate all genetically modified plants. New
rules were issued under its pre-existing legislation for "plant pest risks."
Since then it has granted numerous requests to classify specific GM
plants as "non-regulated articles," thus permitting commercial use
without further controls under its legislation.
In contrast to the USDA, the EPA had political and scientific
difficulties in satisfying the OSTP criteria. Influenced by Vice
President Quayle, new OSTP guidelines imposed more severe
constraints on federal agencies. They had to base requirements upon
"identified risk" from specific product characteristics; they had to show
that "the value of the reduction in risk obtained by additional oversight
is greater than the cost imposed." 19 These constraints deterred the
EPA from publishing draft rules for GMO regulation.
The political climate changed with the Clinton Administration.
Safety regulations became a means to promote environment-friendly,
publicly acceptable biotechnology. It sought to develop a regime which
18 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, Office of Science
and Technology Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (1986).
19 See Principles for Federal Oversight of Biotechnology: Planned Introduction
Into the Environment of Organisms With Modified Hereditary Traits, Office of
Science and Technology Policy, 55 Fed. Reg. 31118 (1990); see also Exercise of
Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions of
Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, Office of Science and Technology
Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753 (1992).
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would be reassuring to the public, predictable and expeditious for
industry, and free of unnecessary political hurdles. 20 Regulatory
procedures were re-oriented towards a state-industry partnership, on
the premise that "biopesticides offer a real opportunity to reduce
chemical-insecticide risks." EPA assistant administrator Lynn Goldman
stated that "We want the crop-protection industry to feel that they are
partners with the EPA in producing substances to control pests."2 1
The OSTP constraints were soon removed so that the EPA could
issue draft rules, e.g., under its legislation for pesticides and toxic
substances (see subsequent sections). Such legislation gives the EPA a
potentially broad remit for what organisms to regulate; it requires an
explicit risk-benefit analysis, and so allows the EPA much discretion
about what data to request.
Environmentalist campaigners preferred that more regulatory
authority be taken by the EPA, partly because it would be more likely
to request new knowledge to clarify risks. The meaning of a risk-
assessment criterion depends upon which agency is responsible. "If
sexual compatibility [hybridization capacity] isn't known, then the
Animal and Health Plant Inspection Service (APHIS) branch of the
USDA, simply says that there is no scientific information which should
worry us, whereas the EPA may take a more cautious approach,"
according to one Non-Governmental Organization (NGO).2 2
Mainstream industry too preferred that the EPA take greater
authority, partly for reasons of public credibility: "A regulatory regime
is warranted to deal with the uncertainty about assuring the
predictiveness of the technology, at a stage when we lack experience in
the field," according to the Bio-Industry Organization. 2 3 Indeed,
sometimes companies have sought an official safety imprimatur even
before approval was legally required for their GMO releases.
20 See Greg Simon, Technology, Trade and Econonic Growth, in BioEurope '93,
International Conference and Proceedings 17 (Senior Advisory Group for
Biotechnology, 1993).
21 See e.g., Ronald Hoyle, EPA Okays First Pesticidal Transgenic Plants, 13 Nat.
Biotech. 434 (1995).
22 Interview with representative from the Environmental Defense Fund (Oct. 27,
1995).
23 Interview with representative from the Bio-Industry Organization (Oct. 18,
1995).
11 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 9 [Winter 2000]
In devising its new rules and assessing commercial products, the
EPA used its advisory committees as a forum for concerns to be
accommodated. Part of each committee meeting has been public,
attended by various constituencies, e.g., industry lobbyists, applicants,
environmental NGOs. The committee meetings have proved less useful
to legitimize specific decisions, which sometimes provoke
disagreements, even within the EPA itself. At best, peer review has
provided a fragile way to base policy on authoritative science. The
Biotechnology Science Advisory Committee (BSAC) was intended to
advise on overall policy, and the Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) was to
advise on pesticidal substances.
In describing the roles of its "committees," the EPA distinguishes
between science and policy: "The SAP is asked scientific questions
about risk assessment of pesticides, not how to regulate pesticides; that
is our decision." 2 4 The science/policy boundary has been more
flexible, depending upon the context and breadth of consensus.
Regulatory criteria for novelty have remained contentious, contingent
upon new GMOs, new scientific knowledge, and new political
pressures.
U.S. agencies have been under deregulatory pressure to base all
decisions upon "sound science." That political slogan was intended to
ensure that the burden of evidence falls upon those who make risk
claims, rather than those who claim safety. Although the slogan put the
EPA on the defensive, the meaning has been broadened in practice.
Sometimes the agency has sought more evidence of safety, and for a
broader range of environmental effects than before, in response to
environmentalist pressure.
Such pressure was catalysed mainly by the Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF) and the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). In
response, the EPA extended its authority to microbial GMOs, and then
to pesticidal and insecticidal genes in GM plants (see below).
Environmental NGOs also proposed that the EPA regulate herbicide-
tolerant crops for their herbicide implications, but the agency regarded
such a measure as unnecessary for protecting the environment. 2 5
24 Interview with representative from the Office of Pesticide Programs branch of the
EPA (June 17, 1996).
25 See Rebecca Goldburg & Doug Hopkins, Addressing Environmental Risks of
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Extending TSCA to "Intergeneric" Micro-organisms
On what statutory basis could the EPA regulate genetically
modified microbes? The 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
mandates the EPA to regulate new chemical substances which present
an "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." The EPA
regarded chemical legislation as an inadequate basis for regulating
GMOs, but Congress would not enact any new law to cover GMOs.26
As early as 1983, the agency announced that it would regulate
microbial GMOs under TSCA. This law normally excluded small-scale
experiments, so the EPA had to devise criteria specifying which GMOs
would be subject to "additional regulation." It defined novelty by
specifying types of genetic insert which could cause a behavioural
change.
"Intergeneric" Criterion
As a preliminary measure in 1986, following the Coordinated
Framework, the EPA proposed to regulate all "intergeneric" organisms
under TSCA. The EPA implicitly attributed a "high risk potential" to
these organisms.27 In practice, the "intergeneric" criterion proved
difficult to implement, partly because biological knowledge could not
always define the boundaries of microbial genera.
Officials preferred simply to issue a process-based rule, i.e., covering
all micro-organisms which result from the genetic modification process,
but this option was blocked by the OSTP guidelines. 28 The TSCA
rule was delayed by long discussions over how to regulate GMOs -
i.e., by the "product vs. process" debate. 29 When EPA draft rules
sought to accommodate the "product-based" criterion during the Bush
Administration, they were blocked by the Executive Office.
After the OSTP constraints were eased by the Clinton
Administration, the EPA eventually adopted the "intergeneric"
Commercializing Herbicide- Tolerant Plants: EPA's Options for Regulating
Herbicide- Tolerant Plants Under FIFRA, in Herbicide-Resistant Crops:
Agricultural, Economic, Environmental, Regulatory and Technological Aspects
(1995).
26 See Krimsky, supra note 13 at 188.
27 Interview with representative from EPA's Office of Toxic Substances (June 17,
1996).
28 Id.
29 See OPP Interview, supra note 24.
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criterion, for lack of a workable alternative. 3 0 Its proposed rule
received a mixed response, even from within industry. Some small
companies opposed the EPA's basic solution - indeed, opposed any
greater authority for the EPA - by denying that GMOs could be
regarded as new "chemical" substances. Those arguments were
promoted in the trade and scientific press. 3 1
By contrast to those critics, the main industry lobbyists accepted
the EPA's basic solution, while criticizing some details. For example,
they argued that "newness" requires scientific criteria for "whether there
has been an intergeneric transfer of a new phenotypic trait."32 That
proposal generated further debate about what GMOs warrant a
requirement for EPA approval prior to small-scale trials.
Particularly controversial were antibiotic-resistance genes, used
routinely as a marker to identify the GMO in the laboratory. Scientists
debated whether the antibiotic-resistance gene could plausibly transfer
to gut pathogens, thus undermining the efficacy of the corresponding
antibiotic. Eventually the EPA proposed that antibiotic-resistance genes
would not warrant requiring a permit for small-scale trials. 33 Earlier
the EPA's advisory committee had urged the agency to discourage the
use of such markers, especially those for resistance to antibiotics
currently in clinical use.3 4 When the EPA exempted these from its
draft rule, the committee did not see the draft before publication. 3 5
Environmental NGOs criticized the broad exemption for encouraging
the indiscriminate use of antibiotic-resistance markers, while
disadvantaging safer alternatives. 3 6 As an EPA official stated, "Yes, in
effect, the rule would steer marker techniques in that direction," though
he defended the rule as validly generalizing from previous safety
30 See Proposed Regulation Under TSCA for Microbial Products of
Biotechnology, 59 Fed. Reg. 45525 (1994).
31 See e.g., Henry Miller, The EPA's War on Bioremediation, 15 Nat. Biotech.
486 (1997); Jeffrey Fox, EPA Issues, USDA Amends Respective Biotech Rules, 1 5
Nat. Biotech. 503 (1997).
32 See Bio-Industry Organization response to Proposed Regulation, supra note 30.
33 See Proposed Regulation, supra note 30.
34 See EPA Report, Meeting of the Biotechnology Science Advisory Committee,
Antibiotic-Resistance Markers Subcommittee (Jan. 19, 1989).
35 See OTS Interview, supra note 27.
36 See e.g., EDF (1994) reply to EPA-OPPT Oct.
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assessments. 37 By implicitly accepting such genetic inserts as normal,
regulators set the stage for later scientific dissent.
Rhizobium Controversy
Later in 1994, a high-profile controversy erupted over such an
antibiotic-resistance gene, in the first product proposed for commercial
approval under TSCA. Research Seeds requested commercial approval
of its Rhizobium as an alfalfa inoculant designed to reduce chemical
fertilizer usage. Having approved small-scale trials of the product, the
EPA now considered any additional uncertainties about large-scale use.
The EPA posed several questions about the potential effects of the
inserted genes for enhanced nitrogen-fixation and for antibiotic
resistance. For example, the microbe could colonize leguminous weeds
and confer greater fitness; or the antibiotic-resistance gene could
transfer to other microbes and harm human health. 3 8 However,
eventually the EPA refrained the original questions in a more narrow
way. Rather than ask simply whether the organism could cause harm, it
asked the advisory committee whether the organism would have a
greater potential for novel behaviours, and whether these would be
caused by the genetic insert as such.3 9
The EPA's advisory committee requested more research on a wide
range of uncertainties, e.g., regarding the stability, transfer and
potential effects of both genetic inserts. 4 0 Advisors disagreed about
which uncertainties warranted more testing.4 1 Subsequently an EPA
official acknowledged the committee's concern about the nitrogen-
fixation gene, but not about the antibiotic-resistance gene.42
The EPA regarded the spread of the antibiotic-resistance genes as
unlikely, while noting that these particular antibiotics have little clinical
use anyway.4 3 Although environmental NGOs accepted the "low-risk"
37 See OTS Interview, supra note 27.
38 See Krimsky & Wrubel, supra note 16 at 151.
39 See Genetic Genie: The Premature Commercial Release of Genetically
Engineered Bacteria 20 (Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER)
ed., 1995).
40 See Biotechnology Science Advisory Committee, Subcommittee on
Premanufacture Notification, Review of Nitrogen-Fixing Rhizobium meliloti: A
Review of the Risk Assessment Prepared by the EPA, (BSAC ed., 1995) Mar. 6,
Appendix I.
41 Interview with representative from New Scientist (Jan. 4, 1995).
42 See OTS Interview, supra note 27.
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assessment for this product, they criticized the EPA for implicitly
accepting the clinical loss of an antibiotic, given that such a judgement
had a more general relevance to marker genes.44
Also in dispute was the "benefits" assessment which is required by
TSCA for each decision. Product efficacy depended upon the
competitive advantage of the product in the rhizosphere, which in turn
depended somewhat upon environmental conditions in the field -
more variable than in the greenhouse. Benefits were inherently difficult
to demonstrate on a consistent basis.4 5
NGOs disputed the EPA claim for benefits and thus its
interpretation of the TSCA requirements. 4 6 "The transgenic
Rhizobium has been approved without any evidence of [improved]
efficacy.... If the 'benefits' are so unappealing, then why take undefined
risks?" asked one officer.47
As an EPA official acknowledged, the agency presumes general
benefits from biotechnology research, as well as making a specific claim
for this product:4 8
We start from the assumption that conducting R&D
benefits society, though we also look at potential risks and
perhaps modify the way in which R&D is proposed to be
done. The 1995 data for this Rhizobium shows an improved
yield (of statistical significance) under specific soil
conditions, e.g., with low nitrogen levels.
Eventually the EPA's own advisory committee questioned the agency's
claim for benefits from this Rhizobium product.49
Moreover, EPA claims were challenged by some staff members in
the western U.S., where alfalfa growers provided the main prospective
market for the product. In an unprecedented move, some staff
43 See EPA-OPPTS, Risk Assessment: Commercialization Request for P-92-403
Rhizobium meliloti RMBPC-2, Dec. 1994; see also OTS Interview, supra note 27.
44 See e.g,. EDF, Comments on Research Seeds application for BSAC meeting,
Environmental Defense Fund, January 1995.
45 See Krimsky & Wrubel, supra note 16 at 146.
46 See Gene Exchange (1994-98) semi-annual publication by the Union of
Concerned Scientists (formerly by the National Wildlife Foundation).
47 See UCS Interview, supra note 4.
48 See OTS Interview, supra note 27.
49 See Krimsky & Wrubel, supra note 16 at 151.
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anonymously published a booklet attacking the agency for unwarranted
claims about both of the inserted genes. In their view, the EPA posed
leading questions to BSAC, and thus pre-empted the terms of reference
for scientific inquiry. They diagnosed the problem as a "breakdown in
independent peer review," and thus a loss of scientific integrity for
decision-making.50
In this case, the EPA had recast the original risk issues as the novelty
of harm and its genetic causes. This shift increased the burden of
evidence for risk, rather than for safety. 5 1 Despite dissent from its own
advisors and staff, the EPA decision met no wider challenge, thus
facilitating commercial approval.
Extending FIFRA to GM Pesticides
On what statutory basis could the EPA regulate GM pesticides?
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), the EPA regulates all such agents; it must ensure that they
cause no "unreasonable adverse effects" on the environment, while
balancing risks against benefits. FIFRA exempted biocontrol agents
from a requirement for an Experimental Use Permit (EUP); this
exemption would have precluded the EPA from regulating small-scale
field trials of genetically modified biopesticides. In order to warrant
such regulation, the agency had to define novelty.
Microbial Pesticides
For GM pesticides, initially the major new category was micro-
organisms. From the mid-1980s onwards, insecticidal genes were
50 According to a BSAC member who subsequently resigned, 'I sensed that EPA
was under tremendous pressure to a pprove the Rhizobium or commercial use. I don't
know what forms this pressure took and whether it originated mostly internally at
EPA or externally. EPA did try to control the BSAC report. They wrote almost all of
it before the committee met and did try to suppress criticism from within EPA. For
me the biggest problem was that the EPA-prepared report drew conclusions that
could only be based on solid scientific information, but there either was no such
evidence at all, or some evidence contrary to what the EPA wanted BSAC to
conclude. I resigned because I could never sign a document so weak scientifically.' Dr
Conrad Istock, personal communication, July 1997.
51 An opposite shift can be found in chemicals regulation. During the earlier
disputes over whether to ban particular chemicals, the EPA recast the safety issue in
ways which lowered the burden of evidence for risk under FIFRA. For example, it
asked the Scientific Advisory Panel whether chemicals were qualitatively 'carcinogenic
in animals,' while the committee preferred to scrutinize the available evidence in
quantitative terms. See Jasanoff supra note 10 at 146.
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isolated from the naturally occurring bacteria Bacillus thuringiensiss
(Bt) and inserted into other microbes, especially Pseudomonas, which
would persist longer on the plant. Given such persistence, a major
concern was potential harm to non-target insects. After much argument
over how to fill the regulatory gap, the EPA conceptualized the Bt gene
as a "chemical"; draft rules required an Experimental Use Permit (EUP)
for small-scale field trials of GM microbial pesticides. 52
After all that difficulty, few products needed assessment under the
new FIFRA rule, for several reasons. R&D efforts were shifted from
microbes to plants. By the early 1990s a major investor in microbial
pesticides, the Monsanto Company, concluded that GM plants would
provide a more profitable market. 53 Also, the EPA discouraged the
development of genetically modified microbial pesticides in a live
form. 54 According to an EPA official:
When one company [Mycogen] proposed to market a
recombinant Bt Pseudomonas, we queried whether this
would be advisable, in view of environmental concerns. We
had decided that the transfer of genes across the gram
positive/gram negative boundary was not documented to
occur in nature and, thus would require either a cautious
approach for containment or full testing for non-target
effects. Also, Jeremy Rifldn's Foundation on Economic
Trends could delay the company by seeking an injunction
on procedural grounds, though most likely the court would
reject the request. In response to our query, the company
offered to kill the microbe before marketing it. EPA helped
to ensure that 100% of the microbes were really killed.55
Following that strategy, the Mycogen Company obtained
commercial approval for the dead microbe. 56 Any controversy was
pre-empted by altering the product to avoid novel risks.
Plant Pesticides
Another new category of GMO was plants with Bt genes or virus-
resistance genes. Initially the EPA did not intend to regulate plants,
52 See Microbial Pesticides; EUPs and notifications [FIFRA], 59 Fed. Reg. 45600
(1994).
53 See Krimsky and Wrubel, supra note 16 at 118.
54 Id. at 122, 132.
55 See OPP Interview, supra note 24.
56 See Anon. 156 Agrow28 (1992).
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though it assessed Bt tobacco plants for trial release in 1986-87.
However, environmental NGOs pressurized the EPA to use FIFRA for
regulating plant pesticides, i.e., pesticidal genes which have been
inserted into plants.
In addition to FIFRA, the EPA also had authority under the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) to regulate pesticide
residues for "tolerance limits." Although nominally intended to
safeguard food safety, this law could be used indirectly to regulate
environmental effects too. So NGOs urged the agency to extend the
FFDCA for regulating pesticidal inserts in plants.
Between 1992-94 the EPA held several consultative meetings to
develop new rules under both FIFRA and FFDCA. Eventually the
agency decided that the biocontrol agents exemption does not extend
to pesticidal substances in plants. 57 On that basis, the agency issued a
draft rule for regulating GM pesticidal substances in plants, on grounds
that the genetic inserts are "chemicals." 5 8 Industry lobbyists regarded
the EPA as the proper authority for this task and supported its basic
proposal.59
There were some disagreements over details, e.g., over exactly what
genetic inserts might generate novel pesticidal substances and which
ones therefore warranted regulatory oversight. Industry and
environmental groups submitted countervailing proposals for
appropriate exclusions from the requirements. 60 At issue here was the
presumed normal baseline for judging a trait as "novel" and thus for
regarding its effects as less predictable. In the U.S. Congress some
members sought to block the EPA rule, partly on the misconception
that it would regulate the entire plant, not simply the pesticidal
substance. The Congress now had a right-wing Republican majority,
being advised by former staff members of Dan Quayle's Council on
Competitiveness. They took encouragement from professional societies
which denounced the draft rule - as "scientifically indefensible," as
regulating "hypothetical risks," and as a deterrent to innovation. 6 1
57 See OPP Interview, supra note 24.
58 See Plant-pesticides subject to FIFRA and FFCDA, 59 Fed. Reg. 60496 (1994).
59 See BIO Interview, supra note 23.
60 Supra note 30.
61 See Jeffrey Fox, Minnows and Academics Hold Up EPA Rules, 15 Nat.
Biotech. 838 (1997).
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However, the main industry lobby group - the Biotechnology
Industry Organization (BIO) - asked critics not to obstruct the EPA
rule in Congress. 62 BIO pursued its minor disagreements discretely,
via written submissions to the EPA. The EPA argued, "We hope to
convince the American people that the technology is safe and to ensure
it's accepted." 63
Potential harm to non-target insects clearly fell within the EPA's
remit under FIFRA. Eventually, when laboratory evidence indicated
risks to Monarch butterfly larvae, NGOs demanded a moratorium or
extra controls for protecting them.6 4 The EPA was petitioned to
require farmers to plant buffer zones around Bt maize. 6 5 Under
environmentalist pressure, the agency announced two extra measures.
On a voluntary basis, "we suggest farmers locate refugia in such a
manner as to serve to protect potentially vulnerable non-target insects,"
since refugia areas can serve as buffer zones between the cornfields and
the habitat of non-target insects. On a mandatory basis, registrants had
to submit protocols outlining their strategies for collecting data on the
various factors relevant to non-target harm.66 A clear scientific basis is
the goal, not the explanation, for more stringent controls.
Managing Insect Resistance
When Bt genes were first inserted into other microbes, and then
into plants, such R&D provoked debate over insect resistance (as well as
harm to non-target insects). Environmentalists and various scientists
warned that insecticidal plants would intensify selection pressure for
resistant insects, thus shortening the useful lifespan of the product. Such
resistance could also undermine the efficacy of naturally occurring Bt,
thus losing an invaluable resource for sustainable agriculture. Debate
ensued on how to minimize the selection pressure, e.g., through high-
62 See BIO Interview, supra note 23.
63 See Fox, supra note 61.
64 See John E. Losey, Linda S. Rayor & Maureen E. Carter, (1999) Transgenic
Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 Nature 214 (1999).
65 Petition to the EPA to require the planting of buffer zones by the New York
Environmental Defense Fund, (July 1999) (on file with the Environmental Defense
Fund).
66 Letter to Bt corn registrants by the EPA, (Dec. 1999) (available on the EPA
website at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides).
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dose strategies to kill all the pests, and/or through statutory controls on
the design of Bt plants. The USDA held a conference which brought
together scientists from industry and academia. 67
Meanwhile biotechnology companies were devising their own
resistance-management strategies. For example, "genetic treadmill"
solutions sought to develop new Bt toxins faster than insects could
develop resistance to the old ones. 6 8 Even if insect resistance
developed in five years, the company might gain an adequate return on
its investment by then.
The EPA initially stayed aloof from the resistance problem, but the
agency eventually accepted some responsibility, for several reasons. 6 9
Environmental NGOs were able to cite a real problem facing farmers
and perhaps the companies themselves. The U.S. has increasingly
serious pest problems, so farmers have greater interest in non-chemical
control methods. Microbial Bt symbolized an irreplaceable resource for
the future of organic agriculture, though it was being sprayed on only
8% of U.S. cotton fields, and less than 1% of corn.7 0
Moreover, FIFRA assigned the EPA a remit for explicitly balancing
risks against benefits. EPA officials argued that pesticidal crops would
bring a significant "reduction in risk" by substituting for chemical
insecticide usage. 7 1 That claim would be undermined by insect
resistance, so the EPA more readily accommodated pressures to avert
such an outcome.
Conditional Registration
For guiding Insect Resistance-Management (IRM), the EPA
consulted its relevant advisory committee. The EPA stated:7 2
We consulted the SAP on criteria for successful
management of insect resistance. The specialists did not
67 Conference hosted by the Agricultural Research Service of the USDA, Scientific
Evaluation of the Potential for Pest Resistance to the Bt Delta Endotoxin: A
Conference to Explore Resistance Management Strategies.
68 See Les Levidow, Agricultural Biotechnology as Clean Surgical Strike, in Susan
Elworthy et al. eds, Perspectives on the Environment II, p. 31-44, (1995).
69 See Jeffrey Fox, Biotech Regulatory "Scope" Set, 10 Biotech. 358 (1992).
70 See Union of Concerned Scientists, Now or Never? Serious New Plans to Save a
Natural Pest Control (1998) <http://www.ucsusa.org>.
71 See Hoyle, supra note 21.
72 See OPP Interview, supra note 24.
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always agree with each other, though their discussion was
useful; it confirmed that our approach considered their
concerns. We want our policy to be based upon sound
science.
That official acknowledged that regulatory decisions are also influenced
by "legal and practical issues," while emphasizing the importance of
"sound science," i.e., "to use the resources at our disposal. " 73 The EPA
had to gather and create such resources - new expert networks for Bt
resistance, plausible cause-effect models, and a partnership with
industry. Such efforts were catalysed by EPA decisions and public
controversy over registering pesticidal agents in three different Bt crops
in 1995.
The first case was Monsanto's Bt potato. The EPA registered the
pesticidical gene without imposing any specific obligation for
resistance-management. 7 4 The company adopted voluntary
guidelines, while continuing research on the optimal refugia
strategies. 75 The company also included the IRM plan in its contracts
with individual farmers.
Environmental NGOs raised an "taction alert," in turn publicized by
the magazine Organic Farming. Consequently the EPA received
several hundred letters criticizing it for prematurely allowing
commercialization and thus the potential loss of Bt. This protest
influenced the EPA response to proposals for commercializing Bt corn
and cotton.
The EPA did not expect Bt corn products from Ciba-Geigy and
Mycogen to dominate the market in the early years, when there would
be natural non-Bt refuges between fields; therefore "market-driven
unstructured refuges" would be adequate to delay resistance. The EPA
required IRM measures to preserve the efficacy of Bt sprays as well as
the Bt crop itself. These IRM plans required registrants to monitor
large-scale use and to devise resistance-management strategies. 76
73 Id.
74 EPA, Pesticide Fact Sheet: Plant pesticide Bt CryII(A) delta-endotoxin and the
genetic material necessary for its production in potato: conditional registration
[Monsanto] (1995).
75 Monsanto, Helping Nature' Bounty: A Discussion of Insect-Control Potato
Plants (1994).
76 EPA, Pesticide Fact Sheet: Bt CryIA(b) delta-endotoxin and the genetic
material necessary for its production in corn: significant new use [Bt-176,
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Compared to the Bt potato case, EPA officials justified their more
stringent approach on several grounds. The corn earworm is also the
cotton bollworm, so resistance in cornfields could pose a problem for
cotton too. The EPA conditions would provide credibility for the
companies' efforts at product stewardship. 77
The IRM plans required farmers to conduct "close monitoring" of
the plant-pesticide to determine if resistance is developing. The
company would test them for any increased resistance and, if detected,
would implement a refugia strategy. 7 8 According to regulators, the
company's plan "would reduce the possibility of resistance developing
for three to five years." 7 9 Registrations were to expire in 2001; the
companies were required to submit specific IRM plans before then, so
the EPA could consider controls when renewing the registrations.
The third case, Monsanto's Bt cotton, was to produce a high dose
of toxin to kill all the insect pests, generating no selection pressure for
resistant ones. Nevertheless, each field had to include refugia of non-Bt
plants so that some Bt-susceptible insect would survive and interbreed
with resistant ones. Refugia had to cover 4% of the cultivated area, or
20% if sprayed with chemical insecticide. 80 This plan changed the
method of seeds marketing and field cultivation. 8 1
Limits ofIRM
In the overall risk debate, Bt resistance is often compared to the
"pesticide treadmill," whereby companies have tried to develop new
agrochemicals faster than pests develop resistance to the old ones. This
analogy plays a double-edged role: an advance warning of Bt resistance,
but also an acceptable baseline for regarding a "genetic treadmill" as a
normal feature of technological progress.
Ciba/Novartis and Mycogen] (1994).
77 Interview with representative from the Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA (Oct.
23, 1995).
78 See EPA, supra note 76.
79 Interview with representative from the EPA statement, (Aug. 11, 1995).
80 EPA, Pesticide Fact Sheet: Bt CrylA(c) delta-endotoxin and its controlling
sequences as expressed in cotton: conditional unlimited registration [Monsanto]
(1995).
81 Monsanto, Corn Borer Protection Through Biotechnology: Technical Guide for
Yield Guard Insect-Protected Corn. (1996).
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Some EPA staff were ambivalent about what they could achieve
through resistance-management strategies. Field inspectors are trained
mainly to detect harm to non-target insects, not survival of resistant
insects, much less to interpret their significance. One staff member
noted that 82
EPA's requirements are difficult to enforce, especially the
monitoring. How to assess the presence of corn borers and
to explain their presence? It could be due to bad seed, rather
than to farmers violating the rules. Some staff feel that we
shouldn't be involved in resistance management.
Other officials acknowledged inherent limits of resistance-management
strategies. According to a USDA official working with the EPA on such
efforts83
We have made an agreement to implement 'reasonable
measures' to minimize the development of resistant insects,
not to prevent their development, which is taken as a given
for Bt crops.
Industry also regarded insect resistance as an acceptable, normal
effect. According to an industry lobbyist, the EPA's conditions were
unwarranted on several grounds.84 First, insect resistance is no new
problem. Next, companies can find more Bt genes to replace ones
which become ineffective. Additionally, they don't need regulation to
reassure the public about this problem. Finally, few farmers use
microbial Bt sprays anyway. In any case, companies did not protest at
the EPA conditions, perhaps assuming that the conditions could be
readily fulfilled, regardless of whether insects develop Bt resistance.
Resistance-management strategies provided the main opportunity
for influence by environmentalist critics. They were joined by organic
farmers' advocates, e.g., at a USDA "National Forum on Bt
resistance."85 Together they successfully pressed the EPA to treat Bt as
a "public good," not an expendable resource.
82 See OPP Interview, supra note 77.
83 Interview with representative from the Animal and Health Plant Inspection
Service, USDA (June 18, 1996).
84 See BIO Interview, supra note 22; Anonymous author, Monsanto Battles
Resistance, 15 Nat. Biotech. 1229 (1997).
85 See Jeffrey Fox, Insecticide Preservation Policy: To Be or Not Bt, 14 Nat.
Biotech. 697 (1996).
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In their view, the EPA's conditional approval rested upon optimistic
assumptions about the refuge/high-dose strategy, and thus about long-
term environmental benefits of Bt crops: "The three Bt resistance plans
basically represent large-scale experiments on an unproven but
promising strategy." 86 The EPA assumed that Bt crops would reduce
chemical usage, while ultimately depending upon a "genetic treadmill"
solution. 8 7 Organic farmers and environmental NGOs widely
publicized the expert arguments about the limits of IRM strategies. 88
Some industry officials argued that IRM strategies should remain
voluntary, under their "product stewardship" program. They
questioned whether FIFRA gave the EPA statutory authority to
regulate Bt resistance according to a "public good" criterion.8 9 Other
companies appreciated the political role of government in
accommodating protest. Although it was cumbersome for a company,
such a requirement could help deal with public concerns.9 0
Mishaps with Bt crops soon reinforced doubts about their long-term
benefits. In July 1996 Monsanto's Bt cotton failed to protect the crop
from cotton bollworm in some southern states. The IRM plan had
presumed that a high dose would kill virtually all the pests, so critics
questioned whether the plan was adequate to delay resistance. 9 1 This
pest is less sensitive than others to the Bt toxin, "so it is misleading to
86 See Gene Exchange, Dec. 1995 at7, 10.
87 See EDF Interview, supra note 22.
88 In September 1997 an NGOs coalition accused the EPA of gross negligence on
several grounds, e.g. that the agency had not proven the safety of the Bt crops before
registering them. see Greenpeace, Greenpeace, farmers and scientists file legal action
against USA EPA over its approval of genetically engineered plants, (1997).
As a stronger legal basis, the coalition also cited the EPA failure to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement under the 1969 National Environmental Protection
Act (NEPA). This petition was the first step towards filing litigation against the EPA
in the Federal Court in February 1999. The coalition did not include the
Environmental Defense Fund or Union of Concerned Scientists - the main
organizations which had been making detailed criticisms of EPA risk assessments. 'A
primary reason we did not join the petition is that it was asking for something - that
EPA rescind its registrations of Bt plants - that has very little chance of happening
(personal communication, EDF officer, Oct. 1997).
89 See Jeffrey Fox, EPA Seeks Refige From Bt Resistance, 15 Nat. Biotech. 409
(1997).
90 Interview with representative from Novartis Corporation (Jan. 27, 1998).
91 See e.g., Fox, supra note 89; see also Jocelyn Kaiser, Pests Overwhelm Cotton
Crop, 273 Science 423 (1996) & Colin Maclwain, Bollworms Chew Hole in Gene-
Engineered Cotton, 382 Nature 289 (1996).
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use this cotton in a high-dose/refuge approach for the bollworm,"
argued a leading entomologist. In August 1996 the EPA restricted
cultivation of Bt corn in the South, on grounds that it could generate Bt
resistance in corn earworm - the same pest as the cotton bollworm.92
Tighter IRM
The adequacy of IRM strategies became more contentious through
further scientific evidence and debate. Bt resistance may not always be a
recessive trait and could spread more rapidly in target insects. 93 Some
insect pests were found to have single-gene resistances to four different
types of Bt.94 Citing this cross-resistance, experts questioned the
contingency plan of substituting alternative Bt genes if insects
developed resistance to the initial one. If a pest already has high
background levels of resistance genes, then considerable resistance may
develop within three to four years, despite the prevalent refugia
strategy. 9 5 According to other scientists, the rate of resistance-
development depends less upon the initial frequency than upon the
survival rate of heterozygously-resistant insects. 9 6 That model raises
the stakes for ensuring the efficacy of the refuge/high-dose strategy.
Towards protecting Bt as a "public good," government and companies
were urged to cooperate: "a public-private partnership approach to
conducting and reporting research will be more credible than privately
sponsored research," argued USDA scientists. 97
In response to these concerns, the EPA's Scientific Advisory Panel
emphasized the difficulties of IRM strategies. "There is disagreement as
to what is the necessary arrangement and relative size of Bt and refuge
field plots, the nature and objective of performance-monitoring
92 See Jeffrey Fox, Bt Cotton Infestations Renew Resistance Concerns, 14 Nat.
Biotech. 1070 (1996).
93 See Fox, supra note 89.
94 See Bruce Tabashnik, One Gene in Diamondback Moth Confers Resistance to
Four Bt Toxins, 94 PNAS 1640 (1997).
95 See Fred Gould et al., (1997) Initial Frequency of Alleles for Resistance to B.t.
Toxins in Field Populations of Heliothis virescens, 94 PNAS 3519 (1997); Bruce
Tabashnik, Seeking the Root of Insect Resistance to Transgenic Plants, 94 PNAS
3488 (1997).
96 See Richard Roush & Anthony Shelton, Assessing the Odds: The Emergence
of Resistance to Bt Transgenic Plants, 15 Nat. Biotech. 816 (1997).
97 See William McGaughey, Fred Gould, & Wendy Gelernter, Bt Resistance
Management, 16 Nat. Biotech. 144 (1998).
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activities ...." 98 The UCS published a report in which some of the same
experts made specific recommendations for tightening the IRM
strategies. UCS added its own warning: "Immediate action is required
because U.S. agriculture is already three years into what has become a
multi-million acre experiment on resistance development and
transgenic [GM] crops." 9 9 Criticizing intensive monoculture, it
reiterated previous calls for a shift to multi-year rotations which would
minimize the need for pesticides: "To the extent that Bt crops further
entrench the present system, they impede that important transition."
100
In May the SAP further recommended that refugia be mandatory,
much larger than previously presumed adequate, and closer to the Bt
crop - both for corn and cotton. According to the SAP, requirements
should be even more stringent for those crops which do not maintain
high Bt levels throughout the growing season, e.g., Ciba/Novartis' first
Bt corn. In order to delay insect resistance, whose risk is "real," the EPA
should "require the use of structured refuges" - i.e., with specified
patterns, sizes, and proximity to the Bt crop. This "sustainable
approach" would be necessary in order to protect "this very valuable
and environmentally-friendly technology."
10 1
Following that advice, the EPA tightened its controls when granting
two further authorizations for Bt corn. Under the earlier approvals, the
EPA had accepted the adequacy of unstructured, market-driven
refugia, especially given that most farmers had not yet adopted Bt
crops. Now the EPA required non-Bt refugia of 20-30%, or 40% if
sprayed with insecticide. As a rationale, the agency cited the need to
preserve the efficacy of foliar Bt sprays as well as the Bt crop. 102 Soon
98 SAP, Final Report of FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel, Subpanel on Bt Plant-
Pesticides and Resistance Management (1998).
99 See UCS, supra note 70; see also Jeffrey Fox, UCS Says EPA Bts Around the
Bush, 16 Nat. Biotech. 324 (1998).
100 Id.
101 See Anonymous author, EPA Urged to Move on Bt, 16 Nat. Biotech. 499
(1998).
102 See EPA, Pesticide Fact Sheet: Bt CryLA(b) Delta-Endotoxin and the Genetic
Material Necessary for its Production in Corn: Update to Include Popcorn Use
[Novartis/Mycogen], (1998); EPA, Pesticide Fact Sheet: Bt Cry9C Protein and
the Genetic Material Necessary for its Production in Corn: New Active Ingredient
[for PGS-America] (1998); see also K.R. Ostlie, W.D. Hutchinson, & R.L.
Hellmich, Bt Corn & European Corn Borer: Long-Term Success Through Resistance
Management, North Central Reg. Res. Project (NCR-602), Univ. of Minnesota
(1997).
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the larger refugia were being promoted by some companies, but advice
varied among the four companies competing to sell Bt maize. 10 3
Eventually an expert panel convened, including academic scientists
and all the companies, to devise a "science-based framework" for Bt
IRM. Their majority view specified refugia sizes, in some cases larger
than those in previously mandated plans. 104 Farmers would be required
to sign contracts undertaking to follow the guidelines. These
arrangements intended to avoid several problems: differences among
the four companies, confusion among farmers, and mandatory EPA
requirements which might be more stringent. For those reasons, the
guidelines were endorsed by the National Corn Growers'
Association. 10 5
Soon the EPA and USDA together asked all registrants to update
their IRM plants to "reflect the current state of the science." Drawing
upon the recent reports cited above, the agencies recommended specific
refugia sizes. According to their retrospective explanation, "no scientific
consensus existed to establish EPA-mandated structured refuge
requirements" when registrations were originally granted in the mid-
1990s. 10 6 Although still no consensus existed, by 1999 the EPA's
scientific rationale could find support in inter-agency agreements and
industry guidelines.
Conclusions: Normalizing Novelty
A debate continues over whether biotechnological control will
remedy - or perpetuate - the problems of intensive agricultural
methods. Earlier symbolic terms, such as GMOs being "unnatural,"
may have waned. 107 Yet agri-environmental values are still at issue,
more subtly, in accounts of biotechnological novelty versus normality.
103 See e.g. AgrEvo USA, New StarLink: The Next Generation of Bt Corn (1998);
see also Novartis Interview, supra note 90.
104 See International Life Sciences Institute, An Evaluation of IRM in Bt Field
Corn: A Science-Based Framework for Risk Assessment and Risk Management
(1999).
105 See Andrea Foster, Crop Developers Seek to Calm Concerns About Bt,
Chemical Week, (Jan. 20, 1999); Alan Dove, Bt Resistance Plan Appraised, 17 Nat.
Biotech. 531 (1999).
106 See EPA/USDA, Position Paper on IRM in Bt Crops, July (1999),
<http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/btworkshop826.htm>.
107 See e.g., Krimsky & Wrubel, supra note 16 at 219.
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When the U.S. government put GMOs under "product-based"
regulation, this framework presumed their normality within an intensive
agricultural model. By contrast, critics emphasized that GMOs pose
unknown novel risks and/or predictable harm, e.g., by analogy to the
pesticides treadmill. They successfully pressed the EPA to regulate
more categories of GMOs, even though the U.S. government
framework restricted the formal channels available to NGOs for
exercising influence. To issue new rules, the EPA had to devise scientific
criteria for genetic novelty which poses a "risk" - a term which really
meant a greater uncertainty about risk; only such novelty could warrant
more stringent regulation of GMOs than their non-GM counterparts.
The EPA's scientific rationale was criticized from various quarters.
Some professional societies and academics opposed the new rules as
"unscientific". Large biotechnology companies basically supported
them, while seeking to narrow the criteria for novelty. Industry more
readily supported EPA rules, given that the Clinton Administration
promoted GM products on grounds that they could reduce
agrochemical usage and thus reduce overall environmental risk.
Having drafted new rules, the EPA devised additional criteria for
predicting the environmental behaviour of GM products for
commercial use. Concepts of novelty have influenced the burden of
evidence. For a nitrogen-fixing microbe, the EPA asked whether its
genetic characteristics could cause novel harm; such a question assigned
a relatively greater burden of evidence for demonstrating risk. For a
microbial pesticide, the company was persuaded to kill it before
commercial sale, so that the EPA need not predict potential harm to
non-target insects.
"Novelty" criteria also influence normative judgements about
potential effects. For GM products which contain antibiotic-resistance
marker genes, regulatory approval accepted the clinical loss of the
corresponding antibiotic, as if such an effect were normal - despite
dissent from advisors and even from some EPA staff. For GM crops
which contain a Bt insecticidal gene, the EPA did not necessarily accept
a genetic-pesticide treadmill as normal. Regulators and companies
elaborated IRM methods which led the companies to become more
accountable for preserving the pesticidal agent as a "public good" for
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sustainable agriculture. Towards that aim, Bt crops underwent novel
market-stage precautions which were eventually institutionalized as
normal practice.
For all these issues, the EPA remained under pressure to cite "sound
science" as the rationale for its policy. Consequently, disputes over
scientific evidence served as surrogates for value conflicts, as in other
regulatory sectors. 10 8 Despite the expert arguments, the EPA's account
of "sound science" gained political authority from a state-industry
partnership and inter-agency agreements.
To summarize: Initially, EPA criteria for genetic novelty justify
extra regulatory controls. In approving products, the EPA evaluates
their potential effects - their predictability, manageability
acceptability and normality - relative to a baseline which is influenced
by public debate. In selectively normalizing biotechnological novelty,
the regulatory procedure sets standards for a future environment.
108 See Jasanoff supra note 10; Jasanoff, supra note 15.
